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| THEME | MAIN FINDINGS | LINKED TO | BibTeX | |
| Yang, J., Hu, X., & Zhang, H. (2007). Effects of a reputation feedback system on an online consumer-to-consumer auction market. *Decision Support Systems*, *44*(1), 93-105. | | | | |
| Game theories applied to online feedback systems.  It establishes a dynamic game-theoretic model for the mechanism of reputation feedback systems in online C2C auction markets. | Our results confirm that the existence of a feedback system improves the well-being of buyers and enhances their willingness to trade, and it deters dishonest behavior from sellers. Thus with the feedback system, the online C2C auction market as a whole becomes more healthy and attractive to buyers and honest sellers alike. | Game theories, Introduction; Online feedback systems | | @article{yang2007effects,  title={Effects of a reputation feedback system on an online consumer-to-consumer auction market},  author={Yang, Jian and Hu, Xiaorui and Zhang, Han},  journal={Decision Support Systems},  volume={44},  number={1},  pages={93--105},  year={2007},  publisher={Elsevier}  } |
| Our findings also confirm that a feedback system does establish a positive correlation between a seller's tendency to cheat and his reputation score; that is, the higher the seller's propensity for cheating, the more likely he will have a high reputation score. |  | |
| Pavlou, P. A., & Dimoka, A. (2006). The nature and role of feedback text comments in online marketplaces: Implications for trust building, price premiums, and seller differentiation. *Information Systems Research*, *17*(4), 392-414. | | | | |
| The analysis of feedback text. This study better predicts how buyers reward trustworthy sellers with price premiums, thus shedding light on the existence and success of online marketplaces that depend on seller differentiation and uncertainty reduction. | While ‘manufactured’ trust-building arguments by Internet stores may be biased, text comments written by buyers in online auction marketplaces are likely to be objective, impartial, and unbiased. | Introduction, OFS | @article{pavlou2006institutional,  title={Institutional Feedback Technologies in Online Marketplaces: An Investigation of Feedback Text Comments, Trust, and Price Premiums},  author={Pavlou, Paul A and Dimoka, Angelika},  journal={Trust, and Price Premiums (February 1, 2006)},  year={2006}}  @article{pavlou2006nature,  title={The nature and role of feedback text comments in online marketplaces: Implications for trust building, price premiums, and seller differentiation},  author={Pavlou, Paul A and Dimoka, Angelika},  journal={Information Systems Research},  volume={17},  number={4},  pages={392--414},  year={2006},  publisher={INFORMS}  } | |
| The tacit nature of feedback comments can convey the notion that a seller has previously acted in an *outstanding* fashion to pursue a buyer’s best interests, or acted in an *abysmal* manner to exploit a buyer’s vulnerabilities. | * Trade-off between costs of text feedback and the provided info * Ratings vs Text feedback * Impact of text on trust/credibility * Concept of trust * Good example for testing algorithm! |
| Most important, a distinct survey item asked the respondents to indicate how many feedback comments they examined for the seller they purchased from. 81% reported examining 25 comments (one webpage), 5% viewed 50 comments, 11% more than 50 ones, and only 3% did not examine any text comments. This suggests that the evaluation of the first 25 comments in a seller’s feedback profile is likely to provide representative information about each seller that is typically examined by buyers. | Numerical ratings and text comments are not mutually exclusive, but complement each other to offer information to help differentiation  •both have advantages and disadvantages  •both valuable |
| Yaakub, M. R., Li, Y., Algarni, A., & Peng, B. (2012, December). Integration of opinion into customer analysis model. In *Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology-Volume 03* (pp. 164-168). IEEE Computer Society. | | | | |
| This paper proposes a new architecture for Opinion Mining, which is a new  approach to integrate costumers opinion into a traditional  CRM system. | 80 percent of data in organization or company is unstructured data [4]. This shows that it is inaccurate to use only the structured data in doing customer analysis because it can only cover 20 percent of the entire data for an enterprise. | Customer Focus Theory; Evaluation | @inproceedings{yaakub2012integration,  title={Integration of opinion into customer analysis model},  author={Yaakub, Mohd Ridzwan and Li, Yuefeng and Algarni, Abdulmohsen and Peng, Bo},  booktitle={Proceedings of the The 2012 IEEE/WIC/ACM International Joint Conferences on Web Intelligence and Intelligent Agent Technology-Volume 03},  pages={164--168},  year={2012},  organization={IEEE Computer Society}  } | |
| For evaluation, all reviews has been read and evaluated by human beings. The effectiveness of the proposed technique is measured by using Precision (p), Recall(r) and accuracy.  **p =TP/(TP + FP); r =TP/(TP + FN)**  where TP (true positives) is the number of reviews that the system correctly extract the right features and opinion; FP (false positives) is the number of reviews that the system falsely extract wrong features or wrong opinion; FN (false negatives) is the number of reviews that the system fails to identify. |  |
| Dellarocas, C. (2003). The digitization of word of mouth: Promise and challenges of online feedback mechanisms. *Management science*, *49*(10), 1407-1424. | | | | |
| It provides an overview of relevant work in game theory and economics on the topic of reputation. | Examples of online feedback mechanisms How they work. Worth to taking a look. As march 2003, may need review  + importance of OFS | Introduction , Game theory, Personalization of feedback (feature based sentiment) | | @article{dellarocas2003digitization,  title={The digitization of word of mouth: Promise and challenges of online feedback mechanisms},  author={Dellarocas, Chrysanthos},  journal={Management science},  volume={49},  number={10},  pages={1407--1424},  year={2003},  publisher={INFORMS}  } |
| **Nash equilibria** (Cripps, Mailath and Samuelson, 2002)  As the mathematical study of interaction of self- interested agents, game theory is the natural foundation for the study of online feedback mechanisms. Game theoretic analyses, however, are often based on stylized abstractions of real systems and are fundamentally grounded on the assumption of rational, utility maximizing economic agents. |  | |
|  | Online feedback mechanisms, in contrast, rely on *private* monitoring of stage game outcomes and voluntary feedback submission. This introduces two important new considerations: (a) ensuring that sufficient feedback is, indeed, provided, and (b) inducing truthful reporting. |  | |  |
|  | They can filter outlying or otherwise suspect ratings. They can offer *personalized* feedback profiles, that is, present different information about the same long-run player to different short-run players. A mechanism that simply publishes the entire history of feedback will not lead to sustainable truth-telling. |  | |  |
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